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Abstract 
Exploring the post-March 2011 Syrian online sphere, this article focuses on nostalgic videos and 
memes that take inspiration from Arabic-dubbed Japanese anime series, which were broadcast on 
national Arab TVs in the 1980s. As part of a dissident social media culture, amateur videos that 
redubbed and edited childhood cartoons have appeared on YouTube since 2011— tackling 
themes of revolution, war, and exile. These videos defied and mocked the Syrian Al-Assad 
regime, as well as the Islamic State group. A result of empowering media practices, the videos 
projected political meaning on childhood cartoons, which have been associated with a 
generational identity shared by now-adult Syrians.  
Highlighting an understudied aspect of media globalization— the influence of Japanese anime on 
Arab popular culture— the article examines a diverse body of social media clips and memes that 
recycle Japanese anime. I analyze their Syrian re-appropriation by offering a typology of 
nostalgic online practices within contexts of war and uprising. These can be summed up in three 
categories of nostalgic mediation: nostalgic defiance, as expressed in calls for political action; 
nostalgic mockery, as reflected in subversive nostalgic humor targeting authority; and nostalgic 
anguish, in reaction to the trauma of war and exile, such as in relation to the Syrian refugee 
crisis. 
Grendizer leaves for Sweden: Japanese anime nostalgia on Syrian social media 
Introduction 
This article examines Syrian activist YouTube videos that take inspiration from childhood 
cartoons and contribute to the creative dissonant digital culture, which has characterized the 
Syrian uprising of March 2011. It highlights one sub-theme within that digital culture— the 
playful reinvention of Japanese-produced and Arabic-dubbed animations, which were initially 
aired on Arab state TVs in the 1980s. The reimagined Japanese anime productions popped up in 
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a revolutionary virtual sphere as part of a new kind of Syrian political engagement. Animated 
robots, pirates, ninja fighters, and forest animals were mobilized in revolutionary action against 
both the Al-Assad regime and the Islamic State group. These cartoon characters expressed 
Syrians’ hopes, fears and pains about becoming refugees in Europe. The reworked cartoons were 
used to express revolutionary fervor and to cope with the traumatic experience of losing one’s 
country to war. In this article, I highlight playful internet memes and re-edited and dubbed 
YouTube clips that activists produced by infusing music and images from their childhood 
cartoons with subversive political messages. 
My analysis focuses on the importance of adult nostalgia towards children’s media and the 
capacity of that nostalgia to express different political impulses. I argue that nostalgic social 
media texts that reflect political positionality must be understood as part of a practice that is 
strategic, creative and empowering. Accordingly, I explore a diverse body of YouTube clips and 
memes and examine their deployment within a context of uprisings and trauma. I argue that the 
contemporary re-appropriation of Japanese anime on Syrian social media reveals multilayered 
and ultimately empowering sentiments of nostalgia. These can be summed up in three categories 
of nostalgic mediation, which I conceive of as: nostalgic defiance, as expressed in calls for 
political action against authoritarian rule; nostalgic mockery, as reflected in subversive nostalgia 
targeting authority; and nostalgic anguish, as a reaction to war and exile, and in this case mostly 
in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis. As I will discuss, some videos re-dub anime favorites to 
create narratives, in which Syrian childhood heroes also become refugees. As refugees are 
unable to physically bring cherished personal objects from Syria in their dangerous long journey 
to Europe, they can bring their memories with them. Projecting their anguish onto their favorite 
childhood cartoons in digital content is one way of doing that. 
This rich case-study about the use of Japanese anime in the Syrian uprising relates to a number 
of key themes in the field of communication. It considers the analytic implications of thinking of 
media in terms of practices versus texts—contributing to the literature on the practice turn in 
media studies (Couldry, 2004, 2012). It also provides empirical evidence of how individual 
media practices reflect and create collective shared memories of current and bygone times. And 
it argues that nostalgic practices intensify different kinds of affective political impulses from 
mobilizing courage for revolutionary action to easing the pains of exile and homesickness.  
It is also a study in authoritarian communication systems within which media texts that may 
seem to have little connection to politics gain political potency. In Syria and neighboring 
countries, Japanese cartoons with their simple plots of good versus evil were dubbed and framed 
to reflect an authoritarian and nationalist political culture with themes of love of land and 
patriotic sacrifice. The reinvented videos within the context of the Syrian uprising indicate how 
Japanese anime got associated with a generational identity of Syrians who grew up in the 1980s. 
The newly-appropriated anime became a favorite backdrop of Syrian social media content that 
reclaims childhood audiovisual memory, de-associates it from authoritarianism, and uses it to 
voice political aspirations.  
Finally, the article sheds light on an understudied aspect of media globalization by considering 
the durable influence of Japanese anime on Arab popular culture. The animated productions, 
such as the super robot, Grendizer, and the ninja boy, Sasuke, were dubbed into modern standard 
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Arabic, mostly in Lebanon and Syria. Through an online search for the Arabic terms of 
“cartoons” and “Syria” on YouTube and Facebook, I found that four anime series, which were 
produced in Japan in the 1970s, and aired in the Arab world in the early 1980s, inspired the 
making of amateur YouTube videos and memes. These series are: Grendizer, Sasuke, Sinan 
(original: Don Chuck Monogatari), and the Treasure Island (original: Tarakajima). These Arabic-
dubbed Japanese productions were reimagined and reproduced through editing images from the 
anime with new revolutionary lyrics or with footage of the Syrian conflict and uploading them 
on YouTube.1 
Digitized nostalgia & the creative dissonance of a ‘new Arab generation’ 
In order to understand the use of nostalgia in the Syrian crisis, it is important to address the 
question: when do objects of nostalgia gain political value and become a source of inspiration for 
dissonant and revolutionary action? I argue that in this case, objects of nostalgia were mobilized 
by individuals and groups as parts of a larger discourse about a generational uprising.  
Much of the literature on nostalgia has been dominated by the binary set forth by the late cultural 
theorist Svetlana Boym (2001), who distinguished between restorative and reflective nostalgia. 
Restorative nostalgia is about reconstructing an absolute past where good battles evil. While 
reflective nostalgia is about dwelling on longing and loss and seeing everywhere fragments of 
memories of a home (Boym, 2001). Keightley & Pickering (2012) complicate this division 
through the concept of the “mnemonic imagination”— a term that seeks to reconcile the relation 
between past memories and future-oriented imaginings and also between personal and collective 
memories. Memory is explained as an intentional form of practice that uses the past “to inspire 
and inform expectation and possibility” and therefore to motivate action in the present (p.78). 
For her part, Georgiou (2012) argues that nostalgia can be strategic as it is used to adapt to 
changing social fields— particularly in relation to diasporic communities (p. 3). Accordingly, 
nostalgia, like memory, is not simply something that we already have but something that we also 
produce individually and collectively and that we strategically maneuver to advance social and 
political aims. Within the context of this study, nostalgia for childhood cartoons was deployed to 
adapt to different political circumstances whether revolutionary politics or forced migration.  
In fact, media play an important role in prospectively providing children with an audiovisual 
memory for the future. In the Syrian opposition digital sphere, it is Japanese cartoons, aired in 
the 1980s, that had a second life because of adult use of social media. Mediated memory, not 
least on social media platforms such as YouTube, magnifies the intersections between the 
personal and collective, the past and the future (van Dijk, 2007, p. 25). Social media platforms 
enable users to creatively express and playfully remember childhood memories, particularly 
those in audio-visual form. As Lomborg (2012) explains, though social media present themselves 
as texts, they are only brought into existence through communicative practices that are 
“emergent, editable, and undergoing a continuous process of development” (p. 221). 
Consequently, there is a difference between analyzing social media material as texts or as part of 
                                                                
1 Given the difficulty of reaching out to the often anonymous activists who produced and uploaded the videos in 
question, this article’s method is limited to analyzing the YouTube videos and contextualizing their producers’ 
practices within the broader study of digital culture in the Syrian uprising, which I have been closely following and 
analyzing since 2011.  
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a practice. In my analysis of the re-imagination of Japanese anime on Syrian social media, I 
distinguish between different political impulses in the strategic use of nostalgia but I also make 
the larger point that the practice of mediating nostalgia itself is an empowering act. 
Another theme within the study of nostalgia that emerges from this case-study is how nostalgia is 
simultaneously deeply personal, capable of triggering individual emotions, and collective in its 
formations and effects. In fact, nostalgia relies on this relationship between individuality and 
collectivity. Its affective force, whether instigating sentiments of pleasure or sorrow, is 
intensified by finding and nurturing the connections between the personal and the collective, and 
the private and the public. Social bonds are strengthened when one expresses a personal 
identification and narrative about what is actually a shared collective experience. Often, social 
intimacy is achieved through the discovery that what one may have assumed to be a personal 
experience turns out to be a collective one. This process follows the cyclical generational coming 
of age. 
To return to the question on the political potency of adult nostalgia towards childhood media, it 
is through the concept of generational belonging that the resonance of children’s media into 
adulthood gains political significance. Guha (1997) explains that the idea of a generation helps 
us focus on the relationship of contemporaneity amongst individuals; and that relationship is 
produced through sharing narratives from across the life span, particularly childhood. Adults 
discover their generational identity through reminiscing about similar childhood experiences 
with each other. In many cases, nostalgia may be understood as a social and cultural 
phenomenon. But it can also fuel political unrest and collective action. As Nora (1996) argues, 
the idea of a generation is the backbone of revolutionary rhetoric with “its ambition to be a 
historical, initiatory rite of passage from the night of despotism to the bright day of liberty” (p. 
502). The idea of a generation facilitates the mobilization for collective action by associating a 
political event not only with a specific political party or orientation but with the identity of an 
age cohort. Active generational consciousness is operationalized as a group united by age 
becomes dominated by the revolutionary event and the objectives of producing its own history 
and exercising the power of collective action (Nora, 1996). 
In the case of the 2011 Arab uprisings, activists’ discourse has been characterized from the outset 
by discussing generational identity and aspirations. The young Tunisians, Egyptians, and 
Yemenis who took to the streets in protest were dubbed by Arab media as “the revolutionary 
generation” (Arabic: jeel al-thawra). The new generation was also associated with the use of 
social media and new technologies that were credited for enabling what was thought to have 
been impossible prior to 2010— mass Arab demands for political freedoms. In both Arab and 
Western media, terms such as the “Facebook generation” or the “Twitter generation” were 
discussed. Whether the deployment of the notion of generation aimed to support or disparage the 
uprisings, the discourse on the “new Arab generation” mirrored the discourse on the uprisings/ 
revolution. And an important part of that constructed generational identity relates to its 
audiovisual memory, which I am arguing, in relation to Syria, has been captivated by Japanese 
anime. 
Geopolitical anime from Japan to Syria 
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In the 1980s, and with the exception of a few Arab productions, Japanese anime dominated Arab 
government-controlled TVs. Syrian TV, like its Arab counterparts, began its daily programming 
schedule in the early afternoon. After the national anthem, followed by a recitation of Quranic 
verses, the Syrian station aired the “children’s segment” and its Japanese content. In fact, these 
cartoons are not only associated with regimes because of their broadcasting on state TVs, but 
also because their dubbing, as I will explain, contributed to Arab regimes’ “system of 
signification” (Wedeen, 1999). It is not a surprise then that these cartoons were reclaimed in 
revolutionary media practices.  
I begin with the context of viewership element. For children in the 1980s (like me), waiting and 
watching the children’s time slot on TV after school or in the weekend became a ritual. These 
conditions of viewership structured the adult collective nostalgia towards these cartoons. Unlike 
today’s individualized children cartoon watching on 24-hour cable channels or online, children 
in the 1980s were watching the same cartoons on the same channel at the same time. As 
Anderson (2006) suggests, the ability to imagine oneself as part of a national community relies 
on the collective temporal contemporaneity of media consumption. While that point has mostly 
been applied to news media, children’s cartoons, and in this case Japanese anime, should also be 
taken seriously in this regard. Accordingly, the memory of watching the cartoons does not only 
concern their content but also their ritualized structuring of the lives of a generation of children. 
Cartoons remind adults today of their childhood daily lives, families, and friends. 
In fact, the popularity of Japanese anime in the Arab world and its enduring impact on the 
region’s popular culture is an understudied aspect of the globalization of Japan’s soft power. The 
globalization of Japanese anime has been scrutinized by media scholars for decades, particularly 
their popularity in the West and in East Asia (See Iwabuchi 2002). Japanese anime exports are 
diverse and have varied temporal and spatial settings. Many productions have futuristic themes 
such as Grendizer (produced in 1975 and aired on Arab TVs in the early 1980s). Some such as 
Sasuke (produced in 1979), which is about a legendary ninja boy, are set in Japan (Clements & 
McCarthy 2006). 
Grendizer, one of the most popular anime series in the 1980s Arab world, begins when Duke 
Fleed of Planet Fleed is forced to leave his home planet when it is attacked by the forces of the 
evil King Vega. Fleed together with his Grendizer spacecraft that can transform into a giant 
robot, reaches planet Earth (Japan) and is adopted by a kindly professor, who gives him the name 
Daisuke (Clement & McCarthy 2006, p.152). When King Vega attacks Earth, Daisuke (and 
Grendizer) fight him and eventually rescue the planet and defeat the Vegans. Pelliteri (2009) 
explains the plot’s symbolism through Japan’s postwar position in the world: the exorcism of 
Japan’s imperial past through its portrayal as victim of extraterrestrial violence, the celebration 
of Japanese technological advancement, in addition to applauding the Japanese-American 
alliance. 
The Arabic-dubbing of Japanese anime was not interested in the subtlety and complexity of its 
meanings in Japan but in adapting them to local and regional Arab political cultures. In fact, 
many of the cartoon jingles’ lyrics were infused with nationalist messages and slogans. They 
echoed an Arab (particularly Levantine) political culture that celebrates national unity, love of 
land, and resistance to occupation, which are themes that resonate with political rhetoric about 
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the conflict with Israel. Many of the cartoons were dubbed in Syria and Lebanon, both of which 
had parts of their national territories occupied by Israel in the 1980s. Importantly, Lebanon was 
in the midst of civil war (1975-1990), which has made themes of national unity gain prominence 
in public discourse, particularly when targeting children. For example, the following are the 
Arabic lyrics of the opening jingle of the ninja boy who fights villains— Sasuke (whose dubbing 
is executed in Lebanon): 
Rise up, put your hand in my hand, rise up to defend your tomorrow and mine; we shall 
defend our land; with our blood we shall defend it; we shall destroy the villains and spread 
the peace; we shall live in happiness and joy; in love and harmony; come on comrades; 
come on friends; with our determination we shall overcome difficulties; put your hand in 
mine and we shall help everyone; Sasuke, your strength is the collective strength, with 
which we shall eradicate the villains and make the good victorious 
This was the language that dominated the tone and content of Arab news media and any 
politically-explicit form of communication. The idea of rising up and defending the land was key 
to the political rhetoric of the Palestinian resistance leading up to the first intifada (literally 
meaning rising up/ shaking off), and which refers to the popular Palestinian uprising against the 
Israeli occupation (1987-1991). 
In addition, many of the themes of the jingle relate to Arab authoritarian political parlance. The 
idea of defending the land or a country’s leadership “with our blood” dominates many political 
slogans. For example, the favored Syrian-Ba’thist slogan, which children were made to routinely 
shout out in school ceremonies, is “with our soul, with our blood, we sacrifice ourselves for you 
Hafez” Al-Assad (in power 1971-2000). Accordingly, cartoons indirectly contributed to the 
Syrian regime’s idealized representations of domination and national community, which Wedeen 
(1999) dubbed as Al-Assad’s cult (p. 32). Authoritarian political communication is often 
dominated by that binary of portraying the world in the simplistic terms ‘we are good’ and ‘our 
enemies are evil,’ one is either a nationalist or a traitor, and of course support for the ruling 
regime is the determinant of where one is politically-placed. 
While much has changed in Arab media since the 1980s, crude state political rhetoric has made a 
strong comeback since 2011. Facing mass popular dissent, Arab regimes amplified a paranoid 
politics dominated by accusations portraying dissidents as infiltrators, conspirators, traitors, 
meddlers, foreign agents, and terrorists. The definition of a patriotic Syrian or Egyptian as 
propagated by state media was communicated as synonymous with support to the ruling regime. 
With the internal and external pressures (and in some cases warfare) against ruling regimes, state 
rhetoric harked back to a polemical language that sees the world in black and white terms. In 
Libya, late dictator Al-Qadhafi dubbed protestors and rebels as rodents and viruses that need to 
be eradicated. In Syria, state rhetoric claimed the country faced a universal conspiracy. Since 
March 2011, the beginning of the uprising, President Bashar Al-Assad declared in front of 
parliament that “Syria is facing a great conspiracy whose tentacles extend to some nearby 
countries and far-away countries, with some inside the country” (“Syria speech” 2011). This was 
echoed by other Syrian officials, who discussed the situation as a conflict between Syrians and 
outsiders, patriots and traitors, and those defending the country versus blood thirsty terrorists. 
The official media made outlandish claims about the universal conspiracy including that what 
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appear to be protests in Syria are in fact cinematic enactments produced by the US and by Gulf 
states (See “syrian4all”2011). Any dissident or ‘conspirator’ was rhetorically ousted out of the 
national body politic (See Kraidy 2015). 
There was a parallel tendency in opposition and activists’ rhetoric, which in their efforts for 
mobilization, also spoke of the uprising in terms of the national will of all Syrians and an 
expression of genuine Syrian patriotism. Anyone seen as criticizing or opposing the protest 
movement, and later the rebel operations, was often deemed as necessarily a supporter of, or a 
thug in the service of, the Al-Assad regime. Accordingly, expressions of sharp divisions and 
severe mistrust dominated the Arab public sphere, whether in pan-Arab news media and social 
media pages or in individual Arab countries. Within this context, it is no surprise that the 
simplistic plots of children cartoons lent themselves to expression of political positions and calls 
for collective action. 
Animated sites of political expression 
During the 2011 Arab uprisings, social media nostalgia facilitated the expression of sentiments 
of courage and revolution but also despair and homesickness as these sentiments became 
associated with a rebelling generation. The examples of the remediation of anime demonstrate 
the diversity in the use of nostalgia on social media within the fast-changing political context of 
Syria. I propose three different but interrelated categories of mediated nostalgia as has emerged 
from this study: nostalgic defiance, which refers to the mobilization of nostalgia in revolutionary 
calls for action against authority, nostalgic mockery, which uses nostalgia for subversively 
poking fun at authority, and nostalgic anguish, which is the expression of a painful longing to an 
abruptly lost homeland. However, the three different kinds of nostalgic sentiments are part of an 
empowering nostalgic media practice. 
Nostalgic defiance 
I use nostalgic defiance to refer to the use of nostalgia for rebellious collective action. It is 
nostalgic because it mobilizes objects of nostalgia to further political action. In fact, the imagery 
and narrative plots of cartoons have easily been adapted to defiant themes. A typical narrative 
trope in children’s programs is that though there may be great sacrifices, good always triumphs 
against evil. This idea must have been comforting during the Syrian uprising, which began with 
peaceful protests facing the killing machine of an army. Nostalgic defiance was expressed in 
videos that were inspired by Grendizer. Since 2012, a clip usually given the title “Grendizer 
Syrian Revolution” has been widely circulated on Syrian social media pages. Uploaded several 
times on YouTube with thousands of views, the one-minute clip is assembled as if it is an 
anthem of the Syrian revolution. It is a montage of pictures from the cartoons merged into its 
opening jingle but with new lyrics (“Aleppo21’s channel” 2012). It starts with the caption “the 
coordination committee of the Planet Fleed,” the name of the planet of the protagonist in 
Grendizer. The “coordination committee” is a reference to the local networks of activists that 
popped up at the beginning of the Syrian uprising to organize protests at the level of 
neighborhoods and villages. The implication is that Planet Fleed is a Syrian territory. It is an 
imagined territory where childhood memories lay. As protests should be organized across the 
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geography of Syria, activists humorously suggest that Syrian sites of memory (Nora, 1996), such 
as Planet Fleed, should also be mobilized for collective action. The new lyrics are: 
It is a revolution, and we shall be victorious. We will sacrifice ourselves for your soil, O 
Syria. Everyone is united for one single goal: to topple the regime. We are creating a 
dream. We have an intellectual project, inspired by all communities. We are spreading 
hope. We are building a nation that includes us all. 
The chorus is “Your people are free, O Syria. [Your people] move with steady and determined 
steps.” The song continues “We resist our enemies with goodness, righteousness, love and 
justice. Everyone, join our glorious Syrian revolution” (Aleppo21’s channel 2012). The lyrics 
capture the hopeful tone of activists’ media output at the beginning of the uprising. The clip acts 
as a political ad that promotes the uprising by using nostalgia towards Grendizer, which most 
Syrians of a certain generation recognize. Accordingly, the implication is that Grendizer is an 
ideal representative of the revolution, who is able to reach out to Syrians from different 
communities who may not have been enthusiastic about the uprising. 
Other Grendizer-inspired videos are based on activists’ favorite scenes from the cartoons 
reworked as a confrontation between the evil forces, which are represented by the regime, and 
the forces of good, represented by the dissidents and rebels. That theme points to another aim of 
resorting to cartoons for political expression, which is to inspire courage through propagating the 
idea that the struggle can only end well for the revolutionary movement. For example, one video 
series is divided into episodes that show a confrontation between forces loyal to the villain King 
Vega and Grendizer. Two clips from this series borrow the Grendizer plot about the showdown 
between good and evil to discuss the Syrian uprising— also communicated as a good versus evil 
confrontation. The fight is to the death. It is also a fight that is hoped to have a happy inevitable 
ending, which is the victory of the good guys.  
In fact, the rhetoric of the Syrian regime and the opposition was clearly reflected in the new form 
of a simplistic animated showdown between two opposing forces. Also, regime rhetorical claims 
that it will never lose power in slogans such as “Al-Assad forever” fit well within cartoon plots. 
For instance,  the first ‘episode’ of the reworked Grendizer YouTube series starts with showing 
an actual protest in Syria (“recifrea's channel”2011a). A man is carried on the shoulders of 
another. He chants as if addressing Syrian authorities “your policy of forcing us to kneel no 
longer works! We want to topple the regime.” The footage of the protest is abruptly interrupted 
by the music of Grendizer and the cartoon. A man’s voice calls on Daisuke, the hero who 
operates Grendizer, “Daisuke, the shabiha (government thugs) are attacking Syria!” Daisuke runs 
in alarmed surprise to operate Grendizer.” We then see King Vega saying “kill them, tear them 
up… I don’t want to see a single revolutionary in the street.” A battle ensues between Grendizer 
and the Vegan enemy spacecrafts. King Vega declares “we will show them that our regime does 
not fall.” The other installment of the series shows Grendizer flabbergasted by the cruelty of his 
enemy (“recifrea's channel”2011b). The evil robot allows Grendizer to escape saying “I will 
spare your life. Spread the word about my brutality!” As he leaves, Daisuke mutters “By God, I 
shall support the revolutionaries until my last drop of blood.” Clearly, these nostalgic clips are 
meant to mobilize Syrians in collective defiance against the authorities. They also claim that the 
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uprising represents the good; while the regime is evil— and that there is no compromise in that 
confrontation.  
The notorious Islamic State (IS) organization has also been portrayed as the villain by Syrian 
social media activists. One video reworks part of an episode from the Treasure Island cartoon, 
which tells the classic story of the pirate treasure hunt. The edited video starts with the pirate 
protagonist Silver tied to a cross, which is a form of torture used by the IS group in the territories 
under its control. Silver is having an argument with his captor pirate, who is described in the 
newly imagined version of the cartoon as an IS member (“aks alser”2014). Silver delivers a 
heroic speech as other pirates (representing IS) prepare to burn his body on the cross, he says: 
Before you kill me, I want to ask a question. How do you expect to stay alive if the people 
and the rebels detest you? ... You should understand the fire of this revolution can never be 
put down. No matter how hard you try, you will never be able to control the Syrian people. 
The revolutionary fire shall burn you and burn Al-Assad. Even if you are in control now, 
this is only temporary. The people will eventually rise up. 
After this speech portraying IS and Al-Assad as the villains and the inevitable losers in the 
Syrian conflict, Silver then manages to win over the rest of the pirates. They free him. And the 
clip ends with that happy conclusion (“aks alser”2014). By equating the Al-Assad regime and the 
IS organization, the video perpetuates the image of the Syrian uprising’s enemies as comprising 
a single force of evil trying to destroy the “good” revolution. The other category that emerges 
from this case is the use of nostalgia for targeted mockery.  
Nostalgic mockery 
I use the term nostalgic mockery to refer to the subversive use of nostalgia in counterhegemonic 
ridicule and humorous belittlement. Indeed, these amateur Syria videos used the anime in order 
to mock, taunt, and poke fun at the government media and state propaganda, particularly their 
conspiratorial language and tone. For example, one Grendizer-inspired video takes aim at the 
aggrandizement of the Syrian president. It mocks Syrian members of parliament during the first 
session held following the start of protests in March 2011, in which the MPs upped one another 
in flattering the president (“Asheq al-Huriya”2011). One MP even proclaimed that Al-Assad 
should rule the world. The video begins with footage from the parliamentary session showing the 
MP addressing President Al-Assad by saying: “The Arab nation is too insignificant for you. You 
should rule the world, Mr. President.” The rest of the MPs applaud their colleague’s statement. 
The video then shows an image of President Al-Assad’s face photo shopped onto the body of 
Grendizer. The audio background consists of a common chant by regime supporters “God, Syria, 
Bashar— that’s all!” (“Asheq al-Huriya”2011). Another video shows an interview with a Syrian 
soldier on national TV, in which he taunts opposition rebel groups by saying that “even if they 
are aided by Western and Arab fighters, even if they get help from outer space, they will be 
defeated.” The edited clip picks up on that extraterrestrial reference by playing the music of 
Grendizer, with a caption saying that Grendizer is the actual enemy of the Syrian army! (“Shilet 
Lawad’eh” 2015). 
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One video mocks Al-Assad’s presidential election campaign in the summer of 2014, which is 
largely considered as a rigged election. Here, the cartoons are used to put words into Al -Assad 
supporters’ mouths by producing audio-visual content that mocks their assumed political 
rationale. The video uses the opening jingle of the cartoon, the Treasure Island. The video blends 
pictures from the cartoon with footage of the Syrian uprising and war. The clip is presented as if 
it is the opening jingle of the original cartoon, which starts with the words “here we are, on the 
path of our treasure” (“Syria Share” 2014a). The reworked lyrics become “Here we are. Take us 
to war” as the video shows images of supporters of the Al-Assad regime in popular rallies as 
well as other images of soldiers preparing for battle. The whole video is a spoof ridiculing the 
supporters of Al-Assad. The new jingle continues “Who else but us will pay the price of our 
brutality? We will pay the big price so you can remain as our prince, our Al-Assad.” Here we see 
footage of soldiers assaulting Syrians. The video then shows a wall covered with posters of the 
pictures and names of Syrian soldiers who had lost their lives in the war— implying that that is 
the price Al-Assad’s supporters are paying. The new jingle song ends with the words “We are 
afraid of freedom because it is dangerous.” The video then mocks Al-Assad supporters and 
portrays them as enemies of freedom, who would rather die for what is deemed a lost cause 
rather than live freely (“Syria Share” 2014a). 
Another video that spoofs pro-Al-Assad election campaign is inspired by the animated ninja boy 
Sasuke cartoon. Similar to the previous example, the YouTube clip uses the opening jingle of the 
cartoon and mixes it with new lyrics and footage to mock the supporters of the Al-Assad regime. 
The lyrics of the song start the same way as the original cartoon. Then the song acquires new 
words as it goes: “We shall sacrifice our lives for our president… Come on comrades, come on 
(fellow) villains, with our bullets and our brutality, we will elect Bashar!” The footage consists 
of a speedy mix of images of the Syrian president and his supporters, in addition to footage of 
warfare and acts of torture apparently perpetrated by Syrian soldiers. 
Two other videos mock Syrian official media by claiming that they have purportedly accused 
Grendizer of instigating revolution and unrest in Syria. The first spoofs a news report on the 
official Syrian news TV Al-Ikhbariya saying that “foreign agents” are operating in Syria. To the 
music of Grendizer, the video proceeds to show a person with a Grendizer mask attack a military 
truck (“Asho News” 2011). Another video spoofs what seems to be a Japanese news 
documentary (“FreeMediaSyria” 2011). While the audiovisual material is taken from the 
Japanese program, captions that supposedly provide translations discuss Syria. The Arabic 
“translation” is basically a cynical and comic commentary about the Japanese public’s shock that 
Grendizer, according to the Syrian Al-Ikhbariya channel, is allegedly the instigator of the Syrian 
uprising. The report says that the Japanese people protested to demand that their government 
investigate the suspected involvement of Grendizer in Syria because everyone had thought that 
“Grendizer had departed to Planet Fleed late last century.” So the Japanese government 
commissions a group of scientists to investigate the Syrian official media claims by subjecting 
monkeys to Al-Ikhbariya coverage. The “shocking result” is that the monkeys develop incurable 
brain damage and cases of uncontrollable nausea. The scientist concludes that Al-Ikhbariya 
“media catastrophe” is the cause. In reaction to the experiment, the YouTube clip shows 
Japanese people holding rallies in support and sympathy for the Syrian people for being 
subjected to government propaganda on Al-Ikhbariya TV. As these clips show, Syrian official 
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media have been a favorite source of mockery as activists ridicule them by making the point that 
what they call news may as well be wildly imaginative anime for the entertainment of children. 
Nostalgic anguish 
By 2014, as the Syrian conflict seemed to lose its revolutionary compass and became more 
fragmented and part of an international proxy war, the nostalgic deployment of anime to express 
determination and defiance or lightheartedness and humor seemed also to diminish. It is this 
affective turn that I am calling nostalgic anguish, which is the use of nostalgia to express 
sentiments of pain and despair— in this case in face of war, exile and a sudden loss of homeland. 
By 2014, many Syrians looked to permanently leave Syria and the Middle East region. Anime 
began to inspire activists to express melancholic sentiments. It is then that one clip shows 
Grendizer to have given up on the uprising in Syria and as departing to Sweden. However, while 
the content of that clip and others show despair, the clip is best read as part of communicative 
practices to actively express a political position and negotiate agency in difficult circumstances. 
So the process of making the video, sharing it, and commenting on it represents a compelling act 
of speech and an attempt to find voice against all odds. 
One example is a Treasure Island-inspired video which remakes a dialogue between the 
protagonist boy Jim and the pirate Silver. Silver’s distressed monologue seems like the inner 
voice of many Syrians, particularly refugees. The affective impact of a statement he makes is 
amplified by the fact that it is shown as the words of a favored childhood cartoon character. 
Silver, the pirate who is dedicating his life to find a lost treasure, is shown to represent the voice 
of Syria. He seems to have been imaginatively transported, along with many Syrians, to 
European exile. The clip in question shows Silver making an emotionally-charged monologue 
about exile (Al- Idilbiya 2014): 
I am stuck between Turkey and Greece. I want to seek asylum. The war in Syria has not 
ended yet. And now the IS (group) is in the picture, my friend. What shall we do? The Free 
Syrian Army (the nationally-oriented and secular-leaning opposition armed group) has 
begun to dismantle… Even if we find the treasure, even if we settle in Sweden or Norway, 
our life will be sad and meaningless. We won’t find anything we were looking for. We 
used to dream of freedom and dignity. Now we search for an alternative home… You 
know Jim, even if I reach Sweden; life is going to be miserable. I will live in a country that 
is not my own. I will yearn for Syria. 
Silver sighs and reiterates “even if I reach Sweden and get the Swedish citizenship, it will not be 
my accomplishment. [Sweden] is not my nation. Life is bound to be miserable.” Silver’s words 
express how Syrians feel completely abandoned in the world— targeted by the government and 
discriminated against and treated as pariahs everywhere they go. As Silver implies, even the best 
case scenario of immigrating to Sweden is not a happy ending. It may be just the beginning of a 
difficult and miserable life of exile and yearning to the homeland. Silver is overwhelmed with a 
sense of defeat and lack of political agency. 
A similar clip uses Grendizer to echo the melancholic sentiment of exile and the disappointment 
over the fate of revolution in Syria. It shows Daisuke giving up on the fight in Syria and escaping 
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to Sweden. The clip is a re-dubbed part of an episode from Grendizer (Qusaybati 2015). It shows 
a battle between Grendizer and his Vegan enemies. The enemy strikes hard and shoots at 
Grendizer. This catches Daisuke (the protagonist who operates Grendizer) off-guard as he says 
“Goodness, I am taking a beating.” We then see Grendizer is shot down from the sky. He falls 
and hits the ground hard. He begins to run as many enemy spacecrafts begin shooting at him. He 
says “What in the world is happening. You all came here!”— a reference to the multiple pro-
regime foreign armed interventions in Syria (notably from Hezbollah, Iran and Russia). As he 
escapes flying away, Daisuke adds “I will never step into Syria again in my life.” Daisuke 
returns to the operation center defeated and he prepares to leave again. “Where are you going? 
You should return and liberate,” he is urged. This is when Daisuke interrupts “leave me the hell 
alone.” We then see Daisuke in the Grendizer spacecraft flying into the sunset. The clip ends 
with his statement “I am going to Sweden. I quit this whole debacle.” Other spacecrafts are seen 
following his lead as we hear a pleading voice “take us with you to Sweden boss” and the 
response is “OK come along!” The clip ends here with the image of the sunset. Again, this 
expresses defeat and despair— while simultaneously acting as a meaningful reclaiming of 
memory. The heroic Daisuke is shown joining his “fellow” Syrians in leaving everything behind 
and going to Sweden with them. 
The other cartoon that inspired a lot of nostalgic expression is Sinan. The cartoon is centered on 
the daily adventures of a young beaver, Sinan. The plot centers on the efforts of the different 
forest animals to co-exist and live together in peace and ward off attacks by wild animals. The 
Arabic lyrics of the concluding jingle focus on the idea of national unity, which is a central trope 
in the political rhetoric of Arab countries with diverse ethnic and sectarian populations. The 
lyrics are: 
How great it is to live well and in peace. How great it is to live in harmony and love. No evil 
harms us. No injustice harms us. Life remains full of hope for everyone. How beautiful it is to 
live in one house. How beautiful it is to be in a single nation. 
These simple words were affectionately recalled since 2011, particularly in the form of memes 
that social media users shared widely on Syria-oriented pages. The memes use Sinan as a 
signifier of life before the current crises and wars— painting a rosy picture of what life was like. 
The following are some examples: 
 
           Fig. 1                                          Fig. 2                                   Fig. 3 
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Figure 1 shows a picture of Sinan above the caption “how great itis to live in peace and 
harmony.” The second part of the meme shows the map of the Arab world with the caption “we 
don’t get it.” The meme juxtaposes the values learnt in childhood about love and peace with the 
current political situation in many Arab countries dominated by war and conflict. Similarly, 
figure 2 shows Sinan and his beaver friend Lalah under the same caption “how great it is to live 
in peace and harmony.” The first image is juxtaposed with a weeping Sinan and the caption 
“now we understand the true meaning of this song.” Figure 3 is a meme that is more cynical in 
tone. Discussing the situation in Syria, it shows two pictures one of Sinan “before the crisis,” 
meaning before the Syrian uprising and war, in which he looks happy echoing the words “how 
great it is to live in peace and harmony.” The post-crisis Sinan is crying, being struck by a 
missile, and carrying a flagon of water in reference to the water shortages and the breakdown of 
services in the warring country. The “after” caption says “God damn you, you have destroyed the 
country.” The second caption is directed at the Syrian “other.” It implies that perhaps it is not 
great or may not be possible to live with others in the country because “they” have destroyed it. 
Indeed, many in Syria, whether they are on the side of the ruling regime or the opposition, direct 
blame on the other side for the downfall of the country. Sinan here then is echoing the voices of 
Syrians, whatever side they are on, in lamenting the country’s fractured affairs. 
Conclusion 
This article has analyzed the circulation of Japanese anime in YouTube clips and social media 
memes that reverberated in the Syrian online public sphere since 2011. My approach to the 
analysis of these clips and memes distinguishes between their textual content and the practice of 
their making and sharing. The distinction influences the understanding of mediated nostalgia. 
The textual content of the memes and clips ranges from nostalgic defiance against dictatorship, 
mockery targeting authority, and anguish in reaction to the horrors of war and the pains of exile 
as Syrians flee their country in their millions. Regardless of the content, the imaginative 
recycling of these anime cartoons is empowering, even when expressing despair and helplessness 
over the state of the country and when anticipating further misery under the “best case scenario” 
of making it to Sweden or Germany. The act of using childhood cartoons for different kinds of 
political expressions is associated with a generation’s reclaiming and mobilizing cherished 
memories of the homeland. That practice of reaching out into personal and collective memory to 
comment on the present and the future is strategic, comforting and supportive.  
The resonance of Japanese anime can be explained by several factors related to Syria’s political 
culture and state media ecology in the 1980s, as well as to the plots and narratives of the anime. 
As with many cartoon productions all around the world, plots are typically simplistic and show 
confrontations between forces of good and evil. In these plots, the heroic protagonist is almost 
certainly the victorious. Such plots lent themselves to authoritarian systems of signification in the 
way they were coopted by an authoritarian Arab media culture through infusing them with 
nationalist messages. However, about three decades later, they were given another life in 
counterhegemonic media practices of redubbing and re-editing. In 2011, Japanese anime series 
became an ideal backdrop of revolutionary political expression because of their capacity to mock 
the propaganda of the Syrian regime in claiming to face a “universal conspiracy”—as if the 
political situation was indeed as simple as a cartoon’s plot. 
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The anime’s good versus evil themes paralleled the polarized media in post-2011 Syria. On one 
hand, government rhetoric did not acknowledge that Syrian dissidents are in fact Syrian— 
calling them infiltrators and meddlers. On the other hand, opposition activists called for a total 
revolution against the ruling regime. Activists mostly either dismissed supporters of the Al-
Assad regime or accused them of harboring allegiances to foreign powers. Within this context, 
the common trope in these cartoons that the victory of the “good guys” is guaranteed despite all 
the hardships must have been appealing. That theme mirrored a common position that despite the 
immense cost in people’s lives and welfare, the Syrian uprising is bound to triumph at the end.  
These cartoons then became weaved into the devastating story of the Syrian uprising and the 
ensuing bloody conflict. The country’s descent into war and devastation has been staggering. In 
2016, there is a sense, which is shared by those who were forced to leave or those who remained 
in Syria, that the country has been lost. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise when Syrians 
express a renewed attachment to their childhood in the country they loved and never imagined to 
lose to war. Resurrected from childhood, Daisuke, Silver, and Sasuke have come to life again 
since 2011. Like many Syrians, they have voiced political aspirations for a better life but also 
expressed the pain, anger and despair of unfathomable suffering and unbearable exile. 
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